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The Right to a Clean and Safe Environment:
A Case for a Constitutional Amendment
Recognizing Public Rights in
Common Resources
JOHN A. CHIAPPINELLI*
Environmental degradation has become one of the most pressing is-
sues facing the nation, growing in public importance and concern since at
least the early 1970s.1 Ironically, this same period was supposed to be
one of dramatic environmental improvement: Congress created the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA)2, which was to stem environmental
degradation, and passed bill after bill to protect and improve specific ar-
eas of the environment. Yet according to some analysts, air and water
quality have enjoyed only local improvements, while nationwide in-
creases in environmental quality have been disappointing.3 New infor-
mation on ozone depletion shows that deterioration of the ozone layer
has proceeded at a much faster rate than originally anticipated and is
now threatening much larger sections of the globe.4 Further, environ-
mental disasters such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill5 and the Dunsmuir,
* J.D. Candidate, May 1992, SUNY at Buffalo School of Law.
1. See, e.g., BRUCE YANDLE, THE POLITICAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:
TRACKING THE UNICORN (1989). As a rough litmus test of public concern, environmental protec-
tion became one of the most hotly contested issues of the 1988 and 1992 presidential elections, and
was built into the platforms of both the Republican and Democratic parties.
2. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was created by the Nixon administration on
December 2, 1970. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 84 Stat. 2087 (1970), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-80,
97 Stat. 485 (1983). I use its creation as a benchmark date, though critics of the EPA would contend
that it has not had enough of an impact on the environment to qualify as a benchmark event.
3. See, eg., PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990).
4. See, e.g., Alexander MacLeod, Europeans Call for Action to Avert New Ozone Hole, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 10, 1992, at 4; Tom Wilkie, Ozone Layer to be Depleted Further, THE
INDEPENDENT, Feb. 10, 1992, at 5; Warren E. Leary, Ozone-Harming Agents Reach a Record, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 1992, at A4; NASA Study: Signs of Rapid Ozone Depletion in the North "Alarming',
Reuters, Feb. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Wire file (recent study done by NASA
shows that ozone depletion is worse than originally forecast).
5. The largest oil spill in U.S. history took place on March 24, 1989, when an Exxon oil tanker
ran aground in Valdez, Alaska, spilling at least 8 million gallons of crude oil into Prince William
Sound. See, eg., Oil Spill is Largest Yet Off Alaska Coast, CHI. TRaB., Mar. 25, 1989, at 3; Maura
Dolan & Ronald B. Taylor, Tanker Spills Oil After Hitting Reef Off Alaska, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25,
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California train wreck6 continue to occur.
This Article contends that the primary cause of such environmental
degradation, as well as the primary obstacle to environmental improve-
ment, has been the loss of public rights in common, shared resources -
air, water, and land. The public's efforts to preserve and protect these
resources have been frustrated by courts that resolve conflicts over
shared resource use on economic and financial grounds - a formula that
decidedly favors large-scale, private commercial entities.
An individual could once claim rights to clean and safe air, water
and land because these resources were seen as belonging to the public.7
While an individual could use the resource, public ownership limited
such use in order to protect the rights held by others in those resources.
As "individuals" evolved into large-scale commercial entities, however,
their consumption of shared resources increased tremendously. When
that use began to be validated on the basis of economic return, the right
of other individuals to act as a brake on resource degradation weakened.
As the United States legal system has come to treat public rights in these
shared resources as entries on a balance sheet, individuals have found
their claims to clean and safe resources very much undervalued. As a
result, individuals in this country have lost what, as this Article will ar-
gue, should be considered a basic human right: the right to a clean and
safe environment.
This Article proposes a constitutional amendment to guarantee the
right to a clean and safe environment, one that would reinvigorate the
idea of public rights in shared, common resources. As a consequence,
economic valuation of resource use would lose its primacy; rights among
resource users would be equally weighted regardless of the consumptive
capacity of the resource user. Conflicts over shared resources would still
consider the economic cost of the competing uses, but factors such as the
health of individuals, the long-term effects on the environment and the
benefits of non-development would have to be more seriously considered.
As Section I explains, air, water, and certain lands were historically
considered to be the property of the general public. Under the treatment
of American courts, however, this public right lost ground, and larger-
1989, at Al; Phillip Shabecoff, Largest U.S. Tanker Spill Spews 270,000 Barrels of Oil Off Alaska,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1989, at Al.
6. A train loaded with toxic chemicals derailed in Dunsmuir, California, on July 14, 1991. The
chemicals poured into nearby bodies of water, and killed hundreds of thousands of fish and other
wildlife along a 45-mile stretch of Sacramento River. See, eg., Spill Kills Thousands of Fish; 100
People Injured, UPI, July 15, 1991, available'in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file.
7. See infra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
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scale private entities were gradually awarded a greater right in those re-
sources by dint of their greater resource use. Comparative economics
became the basis for resolving conflicts between public and private claim
holders.
Section II examines the problems associated with assigning rights on
the basis of resource use. It evaluates the flaws in traditional cost-benefit
analyses, especially how they fail to account for either the economic
value of limited-use and non-use of resources or for the cost of environ-
mental protection legislation. Section II also examines the relationship
between public resources and private use of them. Not only has private
use damaged these resources, but many of the benefits normally associ-
ated with private use are increasingly being attributed to public
infrastructures.
Section III explores means to reinvigorate the rights of the public in
common resources. It critiques the concept of public ownership of com-
mon resources, as opposed to public rights to those resources, especially
as embodied in the public trust doctrine.8 It also examines the concept of
communal property, and discusses how critics of communal ownership
based their criticisms on assumptions that are no longer valid.
Section IV concludes this Article by examining how a constitutional
amendment could correct the environmental problems that have been
caused by this inequitable distribution of rights between public and pri-
vate parties. Since rights have accrued to the large-scale resource user
for economic, not legal, reasons, Section IV argues it would be irrespon-
sible to continue to recognize them on such grounds. It recommends the
drafting of a constitutional amendment that would re-legitimize the char-
acterization of those common resources as common property, and vest
every individual with a right to a clean and safe environment.
I. TRANSFORMATION OF RESOURCES: FROM NATURE'S GRACES TO
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP TO POLLUTED PROPERTY
At its most basic level, any theory of rights in property has to ex-
plain how individuals justify their claim to dominion and control over a
resource that existed before, and will exist long after, they did. It is a
huge task, and this section does not attempt to catalogue early efforts at
8. The public trust doctrine generally provides that certain resources are held in trust by a
government for the benefit of the public. The government can never alienate those resources by
conveying them to private parties. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
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doing so.9 Instead, it looks at how certain theories in American property
law have treated the transformation of recognized "common" resources
(where the public had guaranteed access to the resources) ° into private
property (where an individual or an entity could claim dominion over the
resource).
A. Roman and English Influences on Public Property
The idea that natural resources belong to an entire community of
people who share rights of access and use dates back to at least Roman
times.1 Under the Roman law concept of res communes, "the air, run-
ning water, the sea, and the seashore were common to all."1 2 Private use
of the resources was recognized, but such use did not confer a right of
ownership upon the resource user. 3 Furthermore, the resource user's
access to the resource was conditional upon his or her not damaging the
resource and not impeding the access of other users to it.
14
Early English law also recognized a public right to common re-
sources.15 The resources were generally seen as belonging to everyone,
and were considered to be held in trust by the sovereign in a way that
preserved the public's right to them. 6 While the Crown did have regula-
tory powers over the resources, and as an embodiment of the public will,
was considered owner of these resources, the public's right to use the
9. For an overview of the development of private rights in property, see, RICHARD SCHLATrER,
PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1951); THE CALGARY INSTITUTE FOR THE Hu-
MANITIEs, THEORIES OF PROPERTY: ARISTOTLE TO THE PRESENT (Anthony Parel & Thomas
Flanagan eds., 1979).
10. There is some debate as to whether "fugitive" resources such as air and groundwater, which
flow freely across man-made boundaries, are common property that is actually owned by the public
(res communes) or whether they are unowned resources that belong to no one (res nullius). See S.V.
Ciriacy-Wantrup & Richard C. Bishop, "Common Property" as a Concept in Natural Resources Pol.
icy, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713, 715 (1975). This article assumes a middle ground: the public has
vested rights in those resources, but cannot alienate those resources as a traditional owner would be
able to do.
11. See, eg., MOLLY SELVIN, THIS TENDER AND DELICATE BUSINESS: THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE IN AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY, 1789-1929, at 17 (1987).
12. COMMITrEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, LEGAL ISSUES IN PUBLIC TRUST ENFORCEMENT 2 (1977) [hereinafter
LEGAL ISSUES IN PUBLIC TRUST]. Selvin further defined res communes as meaning resources that
were "incapable of ownership," a list that includes the ocean, the seashore, running water and fish.
SELVIN, supra note 11 at 25.
13. SELVIN, supra note 11, at 25. "Since the sea and seashore were protected by the 'law of
nations,' there could be no private owner of the sea, the shore, or the land underlying the sea." Id. at
2.
14. Id. at 18.
15. Id. at 2.
16. Id.
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resources was nonetheless "uninterrupted and inalienable." 7 This con-
cept of the sovereign as trust holder would eventually serve as justifica-
tion for the state's exercise of police power and eminent domain18 in this
country.
Although the United States largely adopted the English common
law system,19 factors associated with being a revolutionary country, as
well as a largely unexplored and undeveloped country, influenced the
way that law was interpreted and applied. In particular, American suspi-
cion of government power made Americans receptive to the writings of
John Locke, who advocated the sanctity of private property as a defense
against government encroachment.20
B. Lockean Private Property
Locke, in his role as a property theorist, tried to explain one of the
fundamental problems facing any theory of property rights: how human-
kind can claim any ownership of resources not of its own creation.
Locke sought to prove that private rights could vest in hitherto public
resources in a way that effectively defended the individual's claim against
competing claims by government and other interested resource users.
Since Locke was writing in 17th-century England, which had already
been settled for hundreds of years, that proof had to be more sophisti-
cated than a mere claim of being there first.21 Locke's solution lay in
basing the right to ownership on the labor a person applied to the re-
source; i.e., an individual effectively "purchases" the resource using his
labor as capital.
He that is nourished by the Acorns he picked up under an Oak, or the
Apples he gathered from the Trees in the Wood, has certainly appropriated
them to himself. No Body can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then,
When did they begin to be his? .... And 'tis plain, if the first gathering
made them not his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction be-
tween them and common. That added something to them more than Na-
ture, the common Mother of all, had done; and so they became his private
17. Id. at 25. For a brief overview of the changes wrought by the Magna Carta on sovereign
ownership, see LEGAL ISSUES IN PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 12, at 4-5.
18. SELVIN, supra note 11, at 19.
19. Id. at 27.
20. Id. at 20.
21. The "first in time," or "first occupancy" theory, grants rights to the party that claims them
first. For an overview of this theory, as well as Locke's use of it as a launching point, see, JESSE





This Lockean conception of property rights2 3 is striking in the way
it assigns priority, and possession, to the most aggressive resource user.24
The fruit of the tree (which, by implication, would also include the tree
itself) is originally recognized as a common resource in some unsullied
"state of nature" which "God... hath given the world to men in com-
mon."25 It remains common property, however, only until someone
makes use of it. At that point, use gives to the user a private right of
possession: "'tis allowed to be his goods who hath bestowed his labour
upon it, though before, it was the common right of everyone."'26 Using
this very simple formula, Locke achieved a very powerful result:
uniquely individual ownership that vested through the individual actions
of a person. In theory, since labor belonged to the laborer, the exercise of
individual effort created a bulwark against government coercion.
Writing almost a century later, commentators such as William
Blackstone built upon Locke's foundation for the inviolability of private
property.27 With early American legal thought drawing heavily upon
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England,28 the right to private
property advanced in the 18th century from a conception of shared,
God-given resources to that of absolute dominion over land. This do-
minion became so powerful that it could restrict a neighbor's use of his
own land if it interfered with another's own quiet enjoyment.2 9
While conceptions of private property were to go far beyond reli-
ance on Locke, his theories on the nature and origin of property were
nonetheless "accepted throughout the eighteenth century."3" Such ac-
ceptance paved the way for the development of a bias in legal thought
22. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 15-16 (J.W. Gough rev. ed.
1948) (3d. ed. 1698).
23. Obviously, this quote does not represent Locke's full treatment ofproperty rights. It is only
meant as a starting point for discussing how Locke assigned a right to ownership of property based
on the use the claimant makes of the common property.
24. Later in this piece Locke discusses how over-consumption would have ruined development
if not for the creation of money and markets. LOCKE, supra note 22, at 20.
25. Id. at 15.
26. Id. at 16.
27. SELVIN, supra note 11, at 22-24.
28. Id. at 27.
29. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAWs: 1780-1860, at 31
(1977). The apparent contradiction (what of the neighbor's absolute dominion?) was "easily con-
cealed by experience, since the prevailing ideal of absolute property rights arose in a society in which
a low level of economic activity made conflicts over land use extremely rare." But as conflicts did
occur, the conception of absolute dominion over one's own property necessarily diminished. Id.
30. SELVIN, supra note 11, at 23.
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that would recognize property rights on the basis of resource use. This
bias had tremendous impact on a country poised on the edge of enor-
mous economic growth, because it would invite private economic devel-
opment of common resources in order to create an individual claim in
them.
There were competing legal doctrines that limited the pace of indi-
vidual resource development in the 18th century. Two in particular were
used to resolve conflicts in property claims: an "explicitly anti-develop-
ment" theory31 that limited property owners to the "natural use" of their
land;32 and a rule that "priority of development conferred a right to
arrest a future conflicting use."33 The control pressure sprang largely
from an agrarian mindset that was suspicious of strong mercantile inter-
ests,34 but was also fostered by a sense of natural law that frowned on
altering any part of "nature's plan," such as diverting the natural flow of
a stream to direct water towards a mill.35 As economic pressures in-
creased in this country, however, even those constraints would fail to
slow the idea of individual development of shared resources.
By the 19th century, conflicts between competing uses were fre-
quently decided on the use each party made of the resources in question,
not on the basis of the effect of the use on resources or even on the effect
that one party's use had on the property of another. The idea of private
property had undergone "a fundamental transformation - from a static
agrarian conception entitling an owner to undisturbed enjoyment, to a
dynamic, instrumental, and more abstract view of property that empha-
sized the newly paramount virtues of productive use and
development."3"
C. Lockean Logic: Competing Uses and Unequal Capitalization as
Forces in Economic Development of Common Property
Locke offered a solution to the problem of legitimizing a claim in prop-
erty, but the effect of that solution went far beyond the "civic protection"
rationale37 which Locke invoked it for. By assigning property rights in a
31. Honwrrz, supra note 29, at 32.
32. Id. Courts were inclined to favor activities that supported agriculture and animal hus-
bandry, for example, or, where there was a direct conflict, those activities which represented a "low-
est common denominator" of resource use. Id. at 32.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 35.
36. Id. at 31.
37. SELviN, supra note 11, at 19-21.
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common resource on the basis of resource use, Locke's theory tipped the
scale in favor of the parties best able to use those resources, such as
wealthier individuals and corporate enterprises. However, Locke's the-
ory would also lead to competing claims over the same resources, since
the mechanism for assigning rights, i.e. labor, could be applied by differ-
ent parties to the same resources.
Competing claims did arise. States in the northeast often encoun-
tered instances where competing uses of a stream interfered with mill
operators who needed the full force of the stream to generate their
power." Farmers also faced instances where their farmland was flooded
by mill owners who dammed up streams in order to get the hydropower
needed to operate their mills. Under Locke's theory, both parties were
applying their labor to the resource and each would therefore have a
private ownership claim. At some point, a qualitative decision had to be
made as to which labor would have priority.
Furthermore, consider the situation where one party has an advan-
tage in his ability to consume a resource, the prototypical capital owner.
Predicating a right upon how much or how quickly a party can consume
resources locks in any initial disparities in resource-use capabilities, and
certainly engenders little sense of justice or equality. Yet as the economic
pressures of development increased, larger mill operators found that their
capital advantage allowed them to build bigger dams; the bigger opera-
tion in turn convinced courts that the larger operators should have
greater legal protection because they had a bigger interest at stake.39
Over time, these disparities in capitalization levels led to disparities in
legal equity.
Besides the relationship between users, the relationship between the
resource user and the resource itself is also affected when use vests a
property right in the user. Greater rights, or at least rights to a greater
share of the resource, would go to the greatest consumer of that resource.
This would exert a destructive pressure on all of the parties with access
to the common resource to become greater consumers in order to secure
further rights.
By the 19th century, this "development" pressure was exerting itself
in the legal system. Courts were faced with the task of resolving "the
tension between the need for economic development and the fundamen-
38. HORWITZ, supra note 29, at 34-40 (citing Perkins v. Dow, 1 Root 535 (1793); Ingraham v.
Hutchinson, 2 Conn. 584 (1818)).
39. Id. at 42-43.
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tally anti-development premises of the common law."'' In one case a
New York Supreme Court held that a riparian landowner higher up on a
stream could obstruct the flow of water to use for his mill,4 despite the
fact that under common law, the lower riparian landowner would have
had an action for interference. The case marked the "beginning of a
gradual acceptance of the idea that the ownership of property implies
above all the right to develop that property for business purposes."'42
Under such a "reasonable use"43 balancing test, conflicts over
shared resources were resolved in favor of the party who most aggres-
sively used the resource in question. Chief Justice Shaw, in another
water rights cae, 4 allowed a large-scale manufacturing concern to use a
disproportionately large volume of common stream water, basing his de-
cision on the "desirability of maximizing economic development even at
the cost of equal distribution."45 Indeed, with the full support of the
courts, questions of reasonable use became questions of economic effi-
ciency, enabling "common law judges to choose the direction of Ameri-
can economic development."46 This direction pointed away from the
rights of the public in those common resources.
D. The March of Progress: Economic Pressures on Common Resource
Development
As economic growth became the basis for resolving conflicts over
common resource use, the legal interests of the public in those resources
suffered. By the time of the Civil War, most courts were employing "rea-
sonable use" balancing tests to the exclusion of any of the anti-develop-
ment doctrines that had existed less than fifty years earlier.47 By this
time, courts had also rejected the English common law doctrine of waste,
which had acted as a brake on land development. The doctrine of waste
held a landowner liable for any use of the property that unreasonably
interfered with the expectations of other stakeholders in that property;
48
40. Id. at 36.
41. Id. at 37 (citing Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)).
42. Id. at 37.
43. Id. The test "introduced into American common law the entirely novel view that an explicit
consideration of the relative efficiencies of conflicting property uses should be the paramount test of
what constitutes legally justifiable injury," rather than the previous theories of natural use and prior-
ity. Id. at 37-38.
44. Id. at 41 (citing Cary v. Daniels, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 466 (1844)).
45. Id. at 41.
46. Id. at 42.
47. Id. at 40.
48. See, eg., DUKEMINIER, supra note 21, at 179-83. The doctrine was concerned with prevent-
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courts reasoned that it had no place in a newly developing country.49
Unfettered property use became synonymous with progress. While
individuals retained traditional protection against incursion onto their
own property through actions for trespass and nuisance, "by the end of
the first quarter of the [nineteenth] century there already existed a body
of legal doctrine which immunized proprietors from liability for certain
kinds of injurious activity in the interest of promoting competitive devel-
opment of land."50 The same impetus carried resource development into
the twentieth century:
The building of railroads, the irrigation of the ard West, the electrification
of rural areas, the growth of great cities, even the belching steel mills of
Pittsburgh or Gary, idealized America on the march, putting the world on
wheels, serving as the breadbasket and the arsenal of democracy....
The profits that came to landowners in allocating property to develop-
ment automatically brought in their wake a sense of common purpose to a
public enlivened by an idea of progress tied to development. The develop-
ment rights of property owners were truly an engine pulling us where we
wanted to go.51
In short, an individual wishing to use his own property for economic
development of any sort was encouraged to do so by the courts, despite
the spill-over effects such development might have on the resources
shared by the community. Clean potable water suffered in some in-
stances;52 breathable air in others.5
ing a party with a present possessory interest in property from altering or destroying that property to
the detriment of a party with a future interest in it. It was also invoked where a party failed to make
adequate use or take reasonable care of a property, also to the detriment of the parties with future
interests at stake. For example, a party that harvests immature trees from a property for his immedi-
ate gain, rather than leaving the trees to mature for the benefit of the future interest holder, would be
liable for waste. Similarly, a party that failed to develop a property in the midst of a development
boom could also be held liable for waste. Id. at 181.
49. HoRwrrz, supra note 29, at 54-55.
50. Id. at 71-72. In one case, a homeowner was denied recovery for indirect injury to the foun-
dation of his home caused by a city's actions in regrading an adjoining street. Callender v. Marsh, 1
Pick. 418 (Mass. 1823). In another, the New York Supreme Court held that the overflowing of
riparian lands and obstruction of access to private docks were noncompensable injuries where the
state had undertook to improve the navigability of public rivers. Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 146 (N.Y.
1828).
51. Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH, L. REV. 481,
489 (1983).
52. See, ag., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126 (1886) (Corporation's pollution
of drinkable water justified on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis; loss of clean water considered a
"personal inconvenience"), overruled by Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 472 Pa. 115
(1977).
53. See, eg., Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932). In Donner Hanna the
New York State Appellate Division, Fourth Department, examined the appeal of a property owner
[Vol. 40
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Thinking by courts in cases such as Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke
Corp., and Boomer v. Atlantic Cement54 represented a dramatic break
who brought a nuisance action seeking to enjoin the operation of the Donner-Hanna coke ovens
which had been built across the street from her property. Ms. Dove's action claimed that the opera-
tion of the coke oven and the attendant release of large amounts of dirt, steam, coke and coal dust,
constituted a private nuisance. Though the Fourth Department's opinion acknowledged that "when
the plaintiff built her house, the land on which these coke ovens stand was a hickory grove" all five
justices concurred in the decision that:
... the fact that the plaintiff has voluntarily chosen to live in the smoke and turmoil of
this industrial zone is some evidence, at least that any annoyance which she has suffered
from the dirt, gas, and odor which have emanated from defendant's plant is more imagi-
nary and theoretical than it is real and substantial. ... No consideration of public policy
or private rights demands any such sacrifice of this industry.
Id. at 234.
Basically, the court in Donner-Hanna placed the blame for Anonia Bove's situation on Ms. Bove
herself for choosing to live in a "large center of population", and thus considered her loss to be
damnum absque injuria, or a loss which does not give rise to an action for damages against the
person causing it. Id. at 231. The reasoning in Donner-Hanna, was that residents of industrial
centers had no right to a clean environment precisely because they had chosen to live in an industrial
area.
The court's reasoning erred in two fundamental ways which highlight the present need for a
constitutional amendment regarding private rights in a clean environment. First, the court reasoned
absurdly that people always have the choice to live in the "congested centers" with inevitable pollu-
tion from "houses, shops, and factories" as opposed to in the "pure air of the village or outlying
district." Id. The reality of the situation was instead that the wealthy residents of the Buffalo metro-
politan area were probably able to afford the pure air of the suburbs, while the residents of the
neighborhood surrounding the coke ovens and steel plants were economically forced to live in this
section of the city devoted to industry. To reason that the residents of a heavily polluted area have
no right to a clean local environment based upon their "choice" to locate there is folly. A constitu-
tional amendment would guarantee everyone the right to a clean environment, regardless of the
decision an individual makes regarding the physical location of his home.
Secondly, the Donner-Hanna opinion openly embraced the notion that pollution of the air sur-
rounding Ms. Bove's property enhanced the "general good of the community." Id. Such language
demonstrated the court's willingness to ignore the externalities which attended the operation of the
coke ovens in favor of the economic good, e.g. jobs, which resulted to the discrete area represented
by the Buffalo community. However, surely not everyone in the community, and indeed in the
distant areas affected by the operation of the steel mills in Buffalo, (e.g. the Adirondack region which
has recently seen the mass destruction of ecosystems as a result of acid rain) valued the economic
"good" resulting from the continued operation of the coke ovens on the same scale employed by the
Donner-Hanna court.
A constitutional amendment guaranteeing each citizen the right to a clean environment would
have to recognize that private uses of the environment are bound to have "spillover" effects which
affect every citizen in this country, and that the economic "good" of the contested resource use must
be measured against as wide a scale as possible. In addition, such an amendment would allow courts
to overturn the decisions made by legislative bodies such as the Buffalo Common Council, to whom
the Fourth Department deferred in noting that state law granted cities in the state of New York the
power to regulate the location of industries such as the coke ovens in question. Id. at 235. What the
Donner-Hanna opinion did not take account of is that the Buffalo Common Council's decision to
allow Donner Hanna to operate its coke ovens had environmental impacts on both nearby and dis-
tant communities who had no voice in the decisionmaking process.
54. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). In Boomer, the Court of Appeals
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from the conception of shared resources, and demonstrated society's will-
ingness to tolerate over-consumption of resources and pollution by large,
private users in return for short-term economic gain. As the language of
the Court's opinion in Boomer demonstrates, many courts have been un-
willing to make the tough decision to shut down a known source of envi-
ronmental nuisance, based upon the economic harm that will inure to the
owner of the facility and to the public in terms of lost jobs:
Cement plants are obvious sources of air pollution in the neighborhoods
where they operate.
But there is now before the court private litigation in which individual
property owners have sought specific relief from a single plant operation.
The threshold question raised... on this appeal is whether the court should
resolve the litigation between the parties now before it as equitably as possi-
ble; or whether, seeking promotion of the general public welfare, it should
channel private litigation into broad public objectives.
... The total damage to plaintiffs' properties is, however, relatively
small in comparison with the value of defendant's operation and with the
consequences of the injunction which the plaintiffs seek.ss
The Boomer court, while recognizing the obvious hazard presented
by the air pollution produced by the cement plant and the attendant
damage to at least the neighboring property, ultimately determined that
an injunction was too harsh a remedy to impose upon the plant owner.
The court recognized that air pollution was a growing hazard at that
time, but refused to take a small step towards correcting the situation. It
chose instead to take a defeatist attitude, claiming that the air pollution
problem was one too large for a state's highest court to address:
It seems apparent that the amelioration of air pollution will depend on tech-
nical research in great depth; on a carefully balanced consideration of the
economic impact of close regulation; and of the actual effect on public
health. It is likely to require massive public expenditure and to demand
more than any local community can accomplish and to depend on regional
and interstate controls.
A court should not try to do this on its own as a by-product of private
litigation and it seems manifest that the judicial establishment is neither
equipped in the limited nature of any judgment it can pronounce nor pre-
pared to lay down and implement effective policy for the elimination of air
decided that despite trial court's determination that a cement plant's operation constituted a nui-
sance to neighboring landowners, injunction was not a proper remedy due to the large investment
made by the plant's owner, and to the large expense necessary to correct the pollution problem. The
court instead decided that the plant owner should pay the plaintiffs permanent damages in order to
compensate them for their future harm.
55. Id. at 870-71.
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pollution.5
6
The dissent in Boomer, authored by Judge Jasen, recognized the
danger posed by the award of permanent damages to the discrete class of
homeowners immediately surrounding the offending cement plant. Re-
calling that the law of nuisance in New York mandated injunctive relief
where an identified nuisance resulted in "substantial continuing dam-
age,"5" Judge Jasen deplored the payment of permanent damages in the
face of a known, ongoing environmental harm as the court's "licensing a
continuing wrong" ' and said that it was equivalent to the court making
the pronouncement to the cement company "you may continue to do
harm to your neighbors so long as you pay a fee for it."
'5 9
Given the reactionary nature of the federal government's approach
to protecting the environment' , the decisions of representative cases
such as Boomer and Donner-Hanna demonstrate a historical pattern of
buck-passing between Congress, the President, and the courts when it
comes to taking prospective action regarding the declining environmental
state of affairs. Inevitably, the irresoluable conflict between the desire for
progress and the magnitude of the environmental problem is thrust upon
the public as an excuse for not taking definitive steps to combat an admit-
ted societal evil.
E. The "Tragedy of the Commons"
The decline of common resources which attends periods of over-
consumption by large users at the expense of others is a phenomenon
known as the "Tragedy of the Commons."61 Simply put, the "tragedy"
concerns the destruction of a common resource through overuse. While
the community of users might share the rights to the resource, any one
individual's right is too diffuse to actually vest in that resource. Without
such a vested interest, it becomes in the individual's best interest to take
what he can, and let the rest of the community worry about the long-
56. Id. at 870.
57. Id. at 875 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting.).
60. See, eg., Adam Babich, Restructuring Environmental Law, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,057 (1989) (discussing the federal environmental laws, the bulk of which were enacted in
the 1970s, and the failure of the "command and control" methods of regulation by the EPA, which
has resulted from the "enormous scope and complexity of environmental problems and the resulting
scientific and political uncertainties"). Id. at 10,058.
61. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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term effects of his use. The classic example concerns a common grazing
area:
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman
will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons...
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Ex-
plicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility
to me of adding one more animal to my herd?"
[Tihe rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for
him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another.... But
this is the conclusion reached by each and every other rational herdsman
sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy.... Ruin is the destination
toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society
that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons
brings ruin to all.62
The same pressures were at work in this country under the courts'
"reasonable use" balancing test. Having seen that conflicts over compet-
ing uses of a shared resource will be resolved on the basis of economic
productivity, competing users could only be expected to make the "ra-
tional" decision - to exploit that shared resource.
The "tragedy" works in reverse when considering the byproducts of
economic development. Then "it is not a question of taking something
out of the commons, but of putting something in - sewage, or chemical
• ..wastes into water; noxious and dangerous fumes into the air."
'63
Viewed through a development-oriented mindset, it is not surprising to
find that these byproducts were seen merely as the costs associated with
growth.
The ensuing damage to air, water, and land caused by these larger-
scale, heavily-capitalized users was compounded by the fact that the
rights held by the individuals in the community were, like the classic
"tragedy of the commons" case, too diffuse to warrant interference in
how those resources were used.
... [I]n many instances a particular private property use generates far-
reaching effects for other property users. When these effects fall on discrete
property-users in substantial degree, the law has responded to the conflict
somewhat by recognizing private rights of action such as nuisance. One
characteristic of external effects... however... is that they often fall quite
62. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in MANAGING THE COMMONS 20 (Garrett
Hardin & C. John Baden eds., 1977).
63. Id. at 21.
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broadly, affecting a large number of potential claimants, each in relatively
small amounts. While these effects might be cognizable if they reached one
or a few property owners, the effects... may be too broadly felt for any
particular litigant to come forward." 4
The question becomes whether the more heavily-capitalized users
should enjoy a legal right to those common resources along with the eco-
nomic rewards of their common resource use or whether instead tle in-
terests which are diffusely held should be recognized and advanced in the
form of "public rights."6
Locke pointed away from preserving a commonality of rights in
shared resources; American courts merely followed Locke's direction to
what seemed its most likely conclusion. In doing so, however, two major
obstacles were sidestepped without being resolved: the problem inherent
in trying to force economics to follow political ends; and the fact that
public rights in those common resources, while dormant, were not dead.
II. PRIVATE PROPERTY PROBLEMS IN NEED OF SOLUTION: PUBLIC
RIGHTS IN COMMON RESOURCES AND FAIR-MARKET
EVALUATION OF COMMON RESOURCES
As noted above, when property rights in common resources vest on
the basis of economic utility, smaller-scale users, especially individuals,
will find their rights in those common resources contracting.66 Legal
remedies available to the individual are in turn affected by this distribu-
tion of rights, and it is no surprise that where rights assign on the basis of
economic utility of the competing parties, cases decided on the basis of
equity will favor the large-scale user.
Although some early cases enjoined a nuisance notwithstanding great dis-
parity between defendant's investment and plaintiff's actual damages, most
courts, particularly in recent years, have allowed injunctive relief only after
balancing the equities between the parties. Injunctive relief was warranted
only when the harm to the individual outweighed the social value of the
defendant's activity. 67
Assuming arguendo that it is correct to resolve conflicts over com-
mon resource use on the basis of economic utility, it would seem only fair
that the cost-benefit analysis underlying the decision be complete. An
64. Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 155 (1971).
65. Id.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 37-46.
67. FRANK F. SKILLER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 9 (1981).
1992]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
emerging school of economic analysis6" contends that most cost-benefit
analysis concerning competing resource use is not complete, and in fact is
severely flawed. If these economists are correct, the implications are
staggering: not only would all of the prior decisions based on the flawed
analysis be thrown into question, but more importantly, the legal rights
assigned to the larger-scale user on the basis of that analysis would be
similarly unfounded.
A. Problems with Traditional Market Analysis: The Value of Resource
Conservation
The conservation movement's influence in this country has had one
very important consequence: a willingness to question the social utility of
unchecked economic development of common resources. By the middle
part of this century, "new forms of environmental pollution [had] ap-
peared and rapidly intensified: smog, acid rain, excess nitrate and
phosphate in water supplies, pesticides and toxic chemicals in the food
chain and our bodies, and dangerous accumulations of radioactive
waste."69 Spurred on by the development of an environmental ethic,
70
the public soon realized that "technological, economic, and related fac-
tors [could] no longer predominate in decisions concerning growth and
development.... Economic and environmental values [were] not mutu-
ally exclusive; in a very real sense, environmental values [have become]
economic values."
'71
It is under this new mindset that the "ecological economist"
7
school of economic thought has emerged. According to this approach,
conventional economic analysis of resource use has factored in only one
side of the equation - the products generated by the resources used. It
has left out not only the cost to the environment of that resource devel-
opment, but also the economic benefits of competing uses. "[W]hen re-
source depletion and degradation are factored into economic trends,
what emerges is a radically different picture from that depicted by con-
68. "Researchers calling themselves ecological economists are challenging traditional economics
on its own turf, accusing economists of mis-measuring development, underestimating the intangible
costs of pollution and ignoring society's responsibilities to future generations." Peter Passell, Rebel
Economists Add Ecological Cost to Price of Progress, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1990, at Cl.
69. Barry Commoner, Failure of the Environmental Effort, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst)
10,195 (1988).
70. SKILLER, supra note 67, at 335.
71. Id. at 336.
72. See Passel, supra note 68.
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ventional methods. 73
1. Economic Benefits of Non-Development. At the forefront of this
economic reassessment are groups such as the International Society of
Ecological Economists (ISEE), the World Resources Institute, and Re-
sources for the Future.74 Unlike conventional economists, these groups
include figures for and estimates of environmental degradation when de-
termining growth rate benchmarks such as the Gross National Product
(GNP).75 Since these figures are vital to setting domestic economic pol-
icy, failure to include the costs of environmental degradation can
wrongly encourage development policies that end up costing more in the
long run.
As the ISEE points out,
... [i]f we are ever to find workable long-term solutions to our environmen-
tal problems, we need a completely new conception of the relationship be-
tween economics and ecology, one that regards the economic subsystem as
a part of the larger ecological life-support system.... One of the more
important manifestations of this problem is that it creates major mispercep-
tions about how well the economy is doing.
76
Consider the case of a standing forest. The forest provides real eco-
nomic services by conserving soil; cleaning the air and water; providing
habitat for wildlife; and encouraging recreational activities. Under an
analysis by the ISEE, these functions would be assigned a market value
in the same way the forest is currently valued for the lumber it can pro-
vide. Under conventional economic analysis, however, only the value of
harvested timber is calculated into the total, thereby distorting the value
in favor of harvesting.77
One of the worst offenders of this type of valuation is the U.S. Forest
Service itself. It has come under increasing attack7' for policies that
favor timber harvests over competing uses, even in the face of evidence
73. Robert Costanza & Lisa Wainger, No Accounting for Nature: How Conventional Economics
Distorts the Real Value of Things, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1990, at B3.
74. See Passell, supra note 68.
75. "[Economists] at the World Resources Institute have been widely applauded for an attempt
to correct a common distortion introduced by conventional economic practices: the failure to include
natural resource depletion in national income accounts." Id. at C13.
76. Costanza & Wainger, supra note 73.
77. Id.
78. See, eg., Donald G. McNeil, Jr., How Most of the Public Forests are Sold to Loggers at a
Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, at A2; Editorial, National Forest" Going, Going.. ., N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 1991, at A20; Tim Hermach, The Great Tree Robbery, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at A21;
Timothy Egan, Forest Service Abusing Role, Dissidents Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1990, at Al.
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that such preference is not viable economically. By its own admission it
lost money on timber sales in 65 of the 122 national forests it managed in
1990, while critics such as Economists for Congress and the Wilderness
Society estimate that more like 98 to 108 forests lost money.79 The For-
est Service virtually subsidizes companies who log the national forests by
absorbing the costs of road construction and by selling the timber below
cost,80 while ignoring the more lucrative side of national forest manage-
ment, alternative recreational use. In 1990, revenues from forest-related
tourism, hunting and other forms of recreational use were $122 billion,
while revenues from logging totaled $13 billion,"1 yet more than one-
third of the Forest Service budget 2 is devoted to its timber program.
In an extreme example of how traditional economic analysis can
skew valuations of resource use, the ISEE points out that even the costs
of pollution itself can be construed as having a beneficial economic im-
pact. "[T]he billions of dollars that Exxon spent on the Valdez cleanup,
and the billions on the more that 100 other oil spills in the last 16
months, all actually improved our apparent economic performance.
Why? Because cleaning up oil spills creates jobs and consumes re-
sources, all of which add to GNP." 3
The difference in economic valuation under the traditional and the
ecological schools can paint dramatically different pictures of the utility
of certain resource use. Economists at the World Resources Institute, for
example, recomputed the growth rates of Indonesia by factoring in losses
suffered due to soil erosion and decreases in forest resources and oil
reserves. 4 Not only did Indonesia's growth rates drop from a 7.1% an-
nual rate to 4%, but the net value of crop production fell by 40%. Over-
all, the losses attributed to the harvesting of forest reserves ended up
exceeding the value of timber harvests.85
The United Nations has also been encouraging a shift in the ways
that common resources are valuated by promoting the concept of "sus-
tainable development,"8 6 which asks economic planners to recognize the
value of slower resource consumption. Roughly defined as "development
79. McNeil, Jr., supra note 78, at A2.
80. Id.
81. Hermach, supra note 78, at A21.
82. Egan, supra note 78, at Al.
83. Costanza & Wainger, supra note 73.
84. Passell, supra note 68.
85. Id.
86. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FU-
TURE (1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE].
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that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs," 87 sustainable development
incorporates the longer-term impact of resource consumption into cur-
rent economic planning while encouraging the use of alternative, less-
wasteful substitutes.
Additionally, sustainable development asks that current resource
users recognize that economic development of a resource has implica-
tions beyond its immediate use. Neighboring parties who do not benefit
from that resource use could be adversely affected by its byproducts,
such as pollution and waste. Future generations are also closed off from
enjoying that resource once it is depleted.
Environmental groups in several developed countries have been
pressuring their governments to change the way national accounts are
tabulated in order to recognize the downside cost to resource develop-
ment. 8 While it is unlikely that any will do so in the near future, the
United States Congress has at least heard testimony by proponents of the
concept.89
This new accounting points out, in direct contradiction to the pre-
vailing development-oriented mindset explained earlier, two important
things: that common resources can contain value even if they are not
developed for commercial use; and that large-scale resource develop-
ment, while providing short-term economic growth, can actually lead to
a longer-term economic loss. Therefore, the practice of assigning a domi-
nant legal right to a party on the basis of resource exploitation is funda-
mentally flawed.
Clearly, any move towards these new systems of accounting would
have tremendous repercussions for American concepts of private prop-
erty. It would formally reinvigorate the rights of the community in com-
mon resources and force courts to factor in an expanded range of
economic values when deciding conflicts over competing uses.
2. Ample and Just Compensation for Use. Reevaluating resource
use under a more accurate system also raises the issue of compensation.
87. Id. at 43.
88. LINDA STARKE, SIGNS OF HOPE: WORKING TOWARDS OUR COMMON FUTURE 141 (1990).
This follow-up to Our Common Future, discussed supra note 86, examines whether and how govern-
ments are implementing "sustainable development" policies.
89. Robert Repetto of the World Resources Institute has testified before Congress several times
to promote the idea that national accounts, as well as tax and economic policy, should reflect the




Under the current system, when a common resource user depletes (or in
the case of pollution, harms) that resource without compensating the
community of right holders, the user receives what amounts to a subsidy.
To remedy this, the user should compensate the rest of the common-
resource right holders and in a way more immediate than the often-cited
"benefit to the economy as a whole" argument.90 In Locke's "apple tree"
scenario,91 for example, requiring Party A (who wishes to chop down the
tree) to pay Parties B, C and D (the apple gatherers) some replacement
cost for the apples they can no longer gather would better reflect the true
economic cost of Party A's use. It would make equal economic sense for
Parties B, C and D to pay a future apple gatherer for the apples they are
currently consuming.
In fact, truly efficient allocation would demand such a payment,
since the heavily-capitalized enterprise is in the best position to recoup
those costs when it turns around and sells the products it has made using
those common resources. The compensation paid out to the other right
holders in that common resource would simply be assimilated into the
cost of producing the product - i.e., the user would be internalizing the
external cost of using that resource.92 Under the current system, how-
ever, no such compensation is taking place.
In addition to being denied compensation, the community right
holders are also being forced to pay for the right to have their access to
the common resources preserved. The non-user is forced to pay out time
and money - in the form of regulatory tax dollars, voter initiatives and
court action - to preserve a stake in the common resource. The com-
munity of right holders has no chance of recouping that cost since it is
90. By such reasoning, the non-user is compensated for use of the resource by the added prod-
ucts that the user can make and sell back to the non-user; by the gain in the overall economy due to
the user's productive enterprise; and by the increased services that an expanded tax base can bring.
91. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
92. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 (1967)
(more fully describing the concept of internalizing the external costs of a certain activities involving
the use of property). In Demsetz's view, such assimilation of costs is crucial to the definition of
property rights:
... No harmful or beneficial effect is external to the world. Some person or persons
always suffer or enjoy these effects. What converts a harmful or beneficial effect into an
externality is that the cost of bringing the effect to bear on the decisions of one or more
of the interacting persons is too high to make it worthwhile . . . "Internalizing" such
effects refers to a process, usually a change in property rights, that enables these effects
to bear (in a greater degree) on all interacting persons.... A primary function of prop-
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not consuming the resource for profit. The community is ultimately
forced into the position of having to pro-actively defend a common re-
source from use by, in effect, paying the user not to use the resource.
In a sense, the market has reversed. Resource users are not paying
for the right to use those resources; instead, the public pays, through tax-
backed efforts at resource protection, to prevent resource users from
damaging that public property. When store owners are forced to pay in
order to conduct business unmolested by crime, it is called paying "pro-
tection money." The same principle is at work here. Non-users are
forced to pay "protection money" - in the form of tax dollars, campaign
contributions, voter initiatives and other political resources - to avoid
losing their access to a resource that was originally theirs.
3. The Extra Costs of Environmental Legislation. As environmen-
tal problems worsened throughout this century, it became apparent that
traditional legal remedies could not halt the tide of environmental degra-
dation.9 3 As a result, the public was forced to try another tactic: legisla-
tive regulation of common resource use.94 This effort led to the creation
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).9
NEPA is "the most significant piece of environmental legislation...
[for] protecting and preserving the environment." 96 Administered by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),97 NEPA was created to pro-
vide "maximum protection and enhancement of environmental quality
... for present and future generations of Americans. 98 It has been fol-
lowed by the Clean Air Act,99 the Clean Water Act, 'I the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA),101  the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)102 - in all at least a dozen federal statutes dealing with some
93. SKILLER, supra note 67, at 19.
94. Id.
95. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190; 83 Stat. 852 (1969) (cur-
rent version codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988) [hereinafter NEPA]).
96. SKILLER, supra note 67, at 21-22.
97. The Environmental Protection Agency was created in 1970 to administer NEPA. Com-
moner, supra note 69, at 10,195.
98. SKILLER, supra note 67, at 23.
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1970).
100. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1972).
101. Pub. L. No. 96-510; 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1988)).




aspect of environmental protection.103
The effect upon the environment of all this legislation has been
mixed. According to some analysts, air and water qualities across the
nation have enjoyed only local improvement since the enactment of sev-
eral of the major pieces of environmental legislation, while improvements
in overall quality have been less than dramatic."° Others call the results
"embarrassing,"10 5 with overall environmental quality improving only
slightly while suffering some notable declines.' 6 What is undeniable,
however, is that the public has had to pay for this environmental recov-
ery through its tax dollars.
The United States currently spends about $100 billion, 2 percent of GNP,
on pollution abatement, waste disposal and environmental regulation. It is
widely conceded that the current 'command & control' regulatory system is
administratively burdensome on both industry and the government, and re-
sults in an inefficient distribution of abatement responsibilities among pollu-
tion sources.... Despite these expenses, environmental degradation from
the remaining emissions impose economic costs estimated at from $30 bil-
lion to $100 billion per year, 0.7 percent to 2.0 percent of GNP, about
equally split between health and other damages.
0 7
Despite this fact, the costs of administering the EPA and its efforts
to control or repair environmental degradation are usually not factored
into economic analyses when deciding cases of conflicting resource use.
It makes little sense not to include these costs, as they are an important
factor in determining the utility of resource development.
If the federal government was perceived as an effective protector of
the environment, perhaps the costs of environmental legislation would be
a little more palatable. Yet disappointment with federal efforts runs
103. Thomas L. Adams & M. Elizabeth Cox, The Environmental Shell Game and the Needfor
Codification, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,367 (1990).
104. See, eg., A. Myrick Freeman, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION 120 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990)
There has been some improvement in water quality since 1972. In terms of aggregate
measures or national averages, it has not been dramatic.... It is possible that the lack of
dramatic improvement in water quality has been due in part to slow implementation of
the major features of [the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972]." Id.
See also Ralph A. Luken & Lyman H. Clark, How Efficient are EPA's Regulations?, 20 ENVTL. L.
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,419 (1990).
105. Commoner, supra note 69, at 10,195.
106. Water quality in general seems to be deteriorating; overall air quality has improved
slightly, but has also enjoyed some huge reductions in lead and other particulates from the atmos-
phere. Id. at 10,195-97.
107. See supra note 89.
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high, despite pledges that it will take a more active role.108 Even mem-
bers of Congress have expressed their frustration and dissatisfaction with
the pace and effectiveness of federal agencies of their own creation in
protecting the environment. 1°9
The disappointment has spilled over into state governments and has
even hampered government efforts to earmark funds specifically for envi-
ronmental protection action. Voters in New York, for example, voted
against a $2 billion bond measure that would have created an environ-
mental war chest for state clean up and protection efforts. 110 While there
were many reasons for the defeat, the discovery that the Cuomo adminis-
tration had already spent part of the anticipated bond to fund non-envi-
ronment activity certainly did not add to the public's sense of trust. 1 '
In fact, public mistrust over government management of environ-
mental protection in general has encouraged voters in some states to
draft their own environmental protection legislation and to try to pass
this legislation by placing it directly on the ballot.
1 1 2
For example, voters in California tried to pass Proposition 128, a
ballot initiative that promised to make California's environmental protec-
tion laws the most stringent in the nation.'1 3 Proponents professed that
they were tired of government inaction on the environment, but the prop-
108. George Bush considered it important enough to not only work environmental concerns
into his Republican platform during the 1988 presidential elections, but went so far as to designate
himself "The Environment President." Few maintain that he has lived up to that promise.
109. See, eg., House Panel Criticizes EPA for Failing to Issue Pollution Rules, Reuters, Feb. 7,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire file (a House subcommittee criticized the EPA be-
cause it has yet to issue regulations to control smog, automotive and toxic pollution, acid rain and
ozone depletion as required under the Clean Air Act); Glenn F. Bunting & Janine DeFao, EPA
Admits Failure on Chemical in Toxic Spill; An Official Says the Agency Did Not Keep Up to Date
Studies, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at A3 (EPA blamed for failing to scrutinize the reports of poten-
tially hazardous chemicals).
110. See, eg., John J. Doran, New York Environment Bond Opponent Now Favors Smaller Act
for Solid Waste, THE BOND BUYER, Nov. 16, 1990, at 2.
111. Id.
112. For comprehensive discussions of voter initiatives and the environment, see, DAVID
SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKER: THE BALLOT INmTATIVE REVOLUTION (1989); Cynthia L. Foun-
taine, Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by
Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 733 (1988); Madelyn Glickfeld, et al., Trends in Local Growth Control
Measures in California, 6 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 111 (1987); Catherine M. Colinvaux &
Stephen D. Galowitz, Comment, A Modest Proposa" the Cape Cod Referendum for a Moratorium on
New Development, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 559 (1989).
113. Proposition 128, popularly known as "Big Green," was defeated on Nov. 6, 1990. The
proposition itself ran over 16,000 words in length. It would have banned pesticides that cause cancer
and birth defects; phased out chemicals that deplete the ozone layer; tightened emissions standards
for carbon monoxide; preserved certain redwood fdrests; taxed oil companies to pay for oil-spill
cleanups; prohibited the release of toxic chemicals into coastal waters; and established an elected
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osition attacked the problem in a very telling way: it would have shifted
the cost of resource use back to the large-scale resource user.
For example, while oil companies were granted a right to drill for oil
offshore, Proposition 128 would have recognized the rights of other
ocean users (primarily the ocean-going public) to limit that activity -
and to make companies completely responsible for any spills that might
occur.I14 Auto manufacturers would have had to redesign their products
to meet extremely stringent emissions controls, an investment trade-off
they would have to make in order to sell a product that would infringe on
the rights of the public in its claim to clean air. 15
It is debatable whether a voter initiative would be any more effective
than legislation drafted by traditional means. In fact, critics argue that
initiatives in general have all the earmarks of an imperfect solution.
They raise serious questions about their role in a representative democ-
racy, since they bypass many of the checks and balances used in the
traditional legislative process.'
1 6
The initiative's fundamental drawback, however, is similar to that of
the EPA: it is yet one more cost the public must pay to recover and
preserve resources that it never really relinquished rights to. Millions of
dollars are needed for campaigns, public information efforts, voter regis-
tration and signature drives to insure that environmental issues even
make it onto the state agenda.
Government regulation, either by initiative or by traditional legisla-
tive means, ultimately does little to correct the economic imbalance
borne by the community. As long as the larger-scale user can avoid pay-
ing the full market value for the resources it uses, the market will con-
tinue to skew rights in that user's favor by forcing the community to bear
the cost of that user's externalities.
... [I]t may no longer be practicable to manufacture and produce
goods that do not internalize the social cost of their production. Use of air
and water and the environment at large by manufacturers and producers is
no longer free. Environmental, health ... and other regulations concerning
the development and production of energy and consumer goods require that
the externalities of those activities be considered by the producers, manu-
"environmental advocate" position. See Richard C. Paddock, Environmental Issues Lose; Prop. 140
Ahead, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1990, at Al.
114. Id.
115. Id. One positive offshoot of the Proposition 128 effort is that several auto manufacturers
have announced their intentions to introduce battery-powered automobiles into the California mar-
kets during the 1990s.
116. See Fountaine, supra note 112.
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facturers and users.
17
4. The Myth of Corporate Cleanup Costs. Would forcing the pol-
luter to pay the costs of environmental cleanup reflect and distribute the
cost of common resource more realistically, thereby doing away with the
"subsidy" discussed in the previous section? Congress thought so when
it enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980.118 Under CERCLA (popularly
referred to as "Superfund"), a party that may have contributed to the
pollution of a site designated by the EPA as "hazardous" could be held
liable for some or all of the costs of cleaning up that site. The idea was to
not only pass along the costs of environmental cleanup to the polluters,
but to also pass along the cost of proving actual liability. Since a party
could be held liable for the complete cost of the cleanup regardless of the
amount of pollution it actually contributed to the site, that party would
be compelled to discover and sue other polluters in an effort to recover
anything it was forced to pay out.
While in theory this technique allowed CERCLA to have some real
teeth, the practical reality has been disappointing. The 1980s also
ushered in the beginning of the merger and acquisition frenzy in corpo-
rate America. Many major, as well as a host of minor, resource-using
and polluting corporations were bought, sold, or broken into assets and
spun off. As a result, many of the parties originally responsible for pol-
luting sites ultimately identified as hazardous under CERCLA were
often no longer in existence: either physically because they had gone
bankrupt and disappeared; or legally because they had been purchased by
another corporation. And, under the traditional rule of successor liabil-
ity, 1 9 the purchasing corporation is protected from the liabilities in-
curred by the predecessor entity - thereby effectively removing
CERCLA's bite.
117. SKILLER, supra note 67, at 319.
118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1980).
119. Under the traditional rule of successor liability, a corporation buying the assets of another
corporation would not succeed to the liabilities of that predecessor, except in four instances:
1) where there is an express or implied assumption of liability;
2) where the transaction amounts to a consolidation or de facto merger;
3) where the transferee corporation is a mere continuation of the transferor; and
4) where the transaction was fraudulent or lacking in good faith.
See, eg., U.S. v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990); Conn v. Fales Div. of Mathewson
Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1987); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3rd




Courts were cognizant of this, and originally took an aggressive
stance towards the purchaser on the successor liability issue. CERCLA's
policy goals were to be read broadly "in order to make responsible corpo-
rate entities bear the burden of remedying the environmental hazards
they caused which directly harmed the public." 120 Under such a man-
date, courts held "[t]he concerns which led to the evolution of corporate
common law liability for torts to its predecessors [would now] apply with
equal force to corporate responsibility" under legislation such as CER-
CLA. 12 1 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, concluded
that "[its] study of CERCLA persuades us that Congress intended to
impose successor liability on corporations which either have merged with
or have consolidated with a corporation that is a responsible party as
defined in the Act." '122
This stance was very much in line with the EPA's position on the
issue. An agency memorandum 23 in 1984 had predicted that its prosecu-
tion of successor corporations under expanded versions of the "excep-
tions to successor liability" was only the start; it would also go after
successor corporations by incorporating product liability theories into
the "continuity of enterprise" exception to the traditional successor lia-
bility rule. Under such an approach, whether an asset-purchasing com-
pany continues the corporate structure or ownership of the predecessor
would become immaterial. Instead, successor liability would attach if
the successor corporation merely continued "essentially the same manu-
facturing or business operations as its predecessor corporation, even if no
continuity of ownership exists between them." '124 In theory, any pur-
chaser of an ongoing concern could be found liable.
The EPA's prediction, however, never quite came to fruition. Be-
sides the fact that few courts have accepted the EPA's invitation to adopt
this "expanded exception" approach, 125 many of the Circuit Courts of
Appeals began reinvigorating the traditional protections afforded corpo-
rate successors. The Ninth Circuit, for example, refused to find a de
120. U.S. v. Crown Roll Leaf, Inc., 19 ENvTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,262, 20,265 (D.N.J.
1988).
121. Id. at 20,265 (citing Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3rd
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989)).
122. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. 851 F.2d at 92.
123. Agency memorandum from Courtney M. Price, EPA Assistant Admin. for Enforcement
and Compliance Monitoring, Liability of Corporate Shareholders and Successor Corporations for
Abandoned Sites Under CERCLA 14 (June 13, 1984) (copy on file with author).
124. Id.
125. See, eg., David ". Freeman, Vicarious Liability Under Superfund and RCRA: Recent
Trends and Developments, N.Y. ST. B.J. 7 (May 1990).
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facto merger - and thereby successor liability - where a defendant
could not prove continuity of shareholders in Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v.
ASARCO, Inc. 126
What is especially revealing about the Ninth Circuit's decision in
ASARCO, however, is that it was the Ninth Circuit that can be fairly said
to have ushered in the more aggressive stand on successor liability in the
first place. Its landmark decision in Oner II, Inc. v. U.S.E.P.A. 127 in 1979
set the tone for pursuing corporate successors under successor liability
theories by upholding the EPA's use of the theory even though Congress
had never granted the agency that specific authority. The Court had
held that "[t]he EPA's authority to extend liability to successor corpora-
tions stems from the purpose of the statute it administers," 128 not from
any provision in the statute itself. In the span of a decade, the Court
went from an aggressive advocate of environmental protection who read-
ily assigned corporate responsibility for cleanup costs, to a conservative
protector of a corporation's right to be free of its predecessor's environ-
mental degradations.
Corporate polluters have also perversely benefitted from the sheer
glut of actual and potential litigation that the usual Superfund case gen-
erates. It is not unusual for a corporation targeted by the EPA as a "po-
tentially responsible party" to then name tens, and even hundreds, of
other companies, school districts and even municipalities as potentially
responsible contributors to that defendant's cleanup costs.129 Such mas-
sive litigation efforts can tie up litigants for years, and although the cor-
poration might run up considerable legal fees in the process, the delay
itself can forestall penalties until much further down the line - giving
the corporation use and control of those monies in the interim.
Beyond the issue of whether such "polluter pays" legislation is effec-
tive, however, is the fact that such legislation is designed to work "after
the fact;" that is, after the degradation of a common resource has already
occurred. Whether a criminal is arrested after a crime is often of little
comfort to the victim or the victim's family, just as monetary compensa-
tion for the victim of a civil tort often fails to restore what that victim has
lost. As treated below, the issue becomes - and should be - how to
insure that the common resource is not degraded in the first place.
126. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
127. 597 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1979).
128. Id. at 186 (emphasis added).
129. See, eg., Robert Tomsho, Big Corporations Hit by Superfund Cases Find Way to Share Bill,
WALL ST. J., April 2, 1991, at Al.
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Traditional property concepts have also failed to completely account
for the relationship between the rights claimed by the private property
holder and the community that grants those rights. This next section
examines that relationship.
B. Problems with Private Property and Resource Abuse
As the public has become more concerned about the use and protec-
tion of shared resources, 130 it has increasingly blamed pollution problems
on private use of these resources. As a result, the public has been more
willing to critically examine not only the private use of public resources,
but the notion of private property itself.
Social coherence demands evidence and symbols of common purpose, self-
worth and solidarity. As development activity ceases to provide those
things and we are much less persuaded that "America is on the march," we
turn to other things.... It may be that we are only now seeing the final
result of a situation in which belief in free-wheeling development and indi-
vidualism, on the one hand, and the interest in community.., on the other,
are finally reaching an unresolvable tension. With this change the impor-
tance of protection and preservation becomes greater . . . than that of
development. 131
One of the primary factors responsible for this is the relatively recent
awareness of the interrelationship between individual resource use and
the degradation of common resources.
1 32
1. The Spill-over Effect of Private Property Use. Problems of pollu-
tion and resource depletion have reemphasized the interconnectedness of
individual property use and community rights in common resources 133 to
the point where individual consumption is no longer considered an iso-
lated event. 3 As a result, the community has realized two important
things: that private use has harmed the resources, making it impossible
130. While varying somewhat over time on the specifics, the polls consistently indicate that
the environment, broadly defined, is near the top of the list of public concerns.... As a
result, it is now second nature for the public to inquire about the environmental conse-
quences of large public or private development projects and, moreover, to object loudly
and strenuously if it is dissatisfied with the answers it gets.
Portney, supra note 3, at 279.
131. Sax, supra note 51, at 490-92.
132. Id.
133. "Once property is seen as an interdependent network of competing uses, rather than as a
number of independent and isolated entities, property rights and the law of takings are open for
modification." Sax, supra note 64, at 150.
134. Id.
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for the community to regain access to them; and that it must restrict
current users if it wishes to have any of that resource left in the future.
This realization was slow in coming, being almost anathema to the
traditional view of the relationship between resource use and nature.
This country's incredible abundance of natural resources allowed it to
weather the shocks of resource degradation for a considerably long
time. 35 From colonial days to at least the early part of this century,
"nature seemed capable of taking care of itself, natural resources seemed
so plentiful that development and overuse by mankind constituted no
threat, and use of chemicals in agriculture, medicine, and manufacturing
was hardly beyond experimental stages."
136
This pastoral view of America as having limitless resources changed
in the second half of this century, however. Larger enterprises sprung up
that consumed more resources while causing more pollution. Increas-
ingly, pollution problems that originated on privately-held lands spilled
over to affect public, common resources. In addition, advances in science
and technology not only caused environmental problems never before en-
countered, but also provided new insights into how private resource use
was connected to degradation of common resources.137
The system of private property is now seen as one of the culprits
allowing such degradation, and as a result, the very concept of private
property itself has become suspect.
We have endowed individuals and enterprises with property because we as-
sume that the private ownership system will allocate and reallocate the
property resource to socially desirable uses. Any such allocational system
will, of course, fail from time to time. But when the system regularly fails
to allocate property to "correct" uses, we begin to lose faith in the system
itself. Just as older systems of property, like feudal tenures, declined as
they became nonfunctional, so our own system is declining to the extent it
is perceived as a functional failure. Since such failures are becoming in-
creasingly common, the property rights that lead to such failures are in-
creasing ceasing to be recognized.
138
Remember that under Locke's labor-based conception of property
ownership, two rights were originally shared by all parties having access
to common resources: a right in the common resource that exists regard-
less of whether the right is exercised ("given to Men for the Support and
135. SKILLER, supra note 67, at 2.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 8.
138. Sax, supra note 51, at 484.
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Comfort of their being" 39); and a right to that common resource that
vests by applying one's labor. As we have seen, only the second element
of that right survived the American courts' treatment under their "rea-
sonable use" analysis,"4 yet such treatment ignores the interrelationship
between the resource user and the community. No single user gets an
unfettered right to a resource; it comes "subject to" the interests the
community retains in it:
An owner of property rights possesses the consent of fellowmen to allow
him to act in particular ways. An owner expects the community to prevent
others from interfering with his actions, provided that these actions are not
prohibited in the specification of his rights.... [P]roperty rights specify
how persons may be benefitted and harmed, and, therefore, who must pay
whom to modify the actions taken by persons.1
41
As long as the community believes it benefits from that individual's
use, there is little incentive to interfere. "At least to land, where property
rights are assigned by the public in the first instance... the assignment
of property rights presupposes that private ownership would routinely
produce socially desirable use allocations."' 42 Once the community as-
sesses that use differently, however, or begins to value the resources in
question differently, it must reexamine to what extent it will continue to
refrain from asserting the rights it retained in the common resource.
Faced with a "growing conviction that for substantial areas.., the
content of private ownership rights that we have long relied on is mis-
allocating"' 43 those rights, the community must move to reevaluate its
position. This becomes increasingly apparent when the costs and benefits
of private property ownership involve more than just the property owner.
2. Free Rider Problems: Private Property and Community Infra-
structure. A right of private property is a freedom to "use [one's] prop-
erty as [one] sees fit, without objection or interference from [a]
neighbor."'" Under traditional property concepts, the presumption was
in favor of the party making productive use of the property: "it is not
every annoyance connected with business which will be enjoined."
145
That presumption takes on a different nature, however, when the appar-
139. LOCKE, supra note 22, at 15.
140. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
141. Demsetz, supra note 92, at 347.
142. Sax, supra note 51, at 487.
143. Id. at 488.
144. Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932).
145. Id. at 232.
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ent benefits of private property use are instead shown to accrue from the
actions of the community.
Joseph Sax identifies two types of benefits derived from property
use: exclusive and nonexclusive consumption benefits. 146 Exclusive con-
sumption benefits flow exclusively to the private property owner, and the
community. neither has a significant stake nor plays a significant role in
how that pioperty is used. 47
Nonexclusive consumption benefits, on the other hand, concern the
situation where the benefits of private property use are not limited to the
property owner. 148 When the nonexclusive benefits are small, the com-
munity normally has little interest in how that property is used. As the
nonexclusive benefits increase, however - i.e., as the benefits to the com-
munity begin to outweigh whatever benefits the individual user claims -
the property owner loses his capacity to claim exclusivity over control of
that property. 49 This is exactly what has happened with private use of
common resources.
Community interests in clean and safe resources, as well as in wil-
derness and non-developed areas, all recommend against granting exclu-
sive use of any common resource by characterizing it as private property.
Although the common resource might reside temporarily on private
property, as in the case of a stream that passes through the borders of an
individual owner's property, the community retains a greater interest in
having that resource left undamaged than the private user retains in us-
ing it. For example, in the case of managing public lands, "[w]hat were
once viewed as tracts largely to be parcelled out to timber companies and
grazing and mining interests are more and more perceived in terms of
opportunities for public recreation [and] for wildlife protection and
reserves . .."150
It has become apparent that many of the benefits of property owner-
ship do not vest just in that property. "[S]o much of the value that inures
to property owners is itself the product of public investment in what we
146. Sax, supra note 51, at 485.
147. Id.
148. Id. Sax uses the example of an historic building that is owned by a private individual.
Regardless of the use that owner makes of the building, the community also derives a benefit from it
- whether for its architecture, its history, or even just the fact it exists and somehow adds to the
wealth of that community's shared culture. The community benefits from the mere existence of the
building in the same way it benefits "from the existence of as-yet-unread books in the public library:"
while the community can't claim to benefit from some use of those books (because it hadn't yet read
them), it would suffer were those books to disappear. Id. at 485.
149. Id. at 486.
150. Id. at 492.
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call infrastructure (transportation, utilities, etc.), rather than the product
of individual enterprise, that the equitable claim owners have is really not
so great." '151 Allowing a resource user to exclusively benefit from the use
of common resources in effect gives them a "free ride" at the expense of
the community.
Supposing, as is often the case, the immediate community does not
object to, or even encourages, the exploitation of local resources by a
commercial concern because of the jobs and tax revenues it provides.
Can a larger "community" - either geographically or politically - in-
terfere with that local decision?
The current controversy surrounding the logging of old-growth for-
ests to support the local timber industry presents an obvious example,
but any town largely supported by a single polluting factory faces a simi-
lar situation. With the old-growth forests, much of the country appar-
ently derives "nonexclusive benefits" from the existence of trees that are
several hundred years old, and those benefits are currently being valued
more highly than are the "exclusive benefits" of local employment.
The case of a local polluting factory having to account for pollution
to shared resources should be decided no differently. The tradeoff of jobs
for pollution in Town A, where the factory is located, is not limited to
Town A; Town B, which must live with the air and water effluent of that
factory, does not enjoy any of the benefits of that enterprise, so the bene-
fits of resource protection and preservation are seen by Town B as out-
weighing the benefits deriving from Town A's "exclusive" consumption.
The move to recognize "nonexclusive benefits" in clean and safe
common resources does not suggest a moratorium on commercial activ-
ity, nor does it wistfully yearn for a return to pre-industrial America. It
merely recommends a less-damaging approach to resource use in return
for longer-term environmental health. Any economic displacement suf-
fered by a local community during this transition is merely analogous to
what non-industrial, "natural use" resource users went through during
the 18th century,152 where the value accorded their resource use de-
creased while the value accorded the output of commercial enterprises
increased. When seen as part of that continuum, "nonexclusive benefits"
represent another shift in the way private use of common, shared re-
sources are valued.
More than that, however, recognizing the existence of a "nonexclu-
151. Id. at 494.
152. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
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sive benefit of consumption" has brought us back to the missing half of
the Lockean paradigm: it is none other than the continuing public inter-
est in common resources.
153
In short, since the benefits of property ownership depend more on
the community, and the costs of property use are borne more by non-
benefitting parties, it is time to re-recognize that a right exists in those
common resources independent of any claim based on ownership. In
short, it is time to resurrect the notion of a public right in those common
resources.
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE COMMONS
REVISITED: ALTERNATIVE ROUTES TO PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
As noted earlier,154 both Roman and English law recognized the
right of the public to use certain common resources - primarily tide-
lands, navigable waters and their adjacent lands, and fish.155 Ownership
remained with the sovereign, 156 but more in the form of a trust; the pub-
lic was deemed to have an unqualified right of access and use. These
"public trust" resources were different than "general public property
which the sovereign could routinely grant to private owners,"' 57 but
were nonetheless considered to be owned by the sovereign.' In brief,
this "public trust doctrine" states that: "tidelands and certain other lands
and waters are held in a trust by the citizens of the various states and
municipalities to be used only for the benefit of the commonwealth. The
doctrine, in its most abstract sense, prohibits the alienation of these re-
sources for private benefit."' 159
As the public trust doctrine evolved in English law, however, it be-
came involved in a struggle between the king and Parliament. It ended
up subject to the control of Parliament, which exercised "what we would
call the police power, to enlarge or diminish the public rights for some
legitimate public purpose."'" It was this version of the doctrine that
was adopted in the United States.
153. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
155. SELVIN, supra note 11, at 17-18.
156. Id. at 18-19.
157. Sax, supra note 8, at 475.
158. Laura H. Kosloff, Comment, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi" Is the Public Trust Be-
coming Synonymous with the Public Interest?, 18 ENvL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,200 (June
1988).
159. SELVIN, supra note 11, at 1.
160. Sax, supra note 8, at 476.
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Here, the public trust was applied to the same resources it had been
applied to in England, but the states took the place of the sovereign as
the owner of the resources. 161 There were some important limitations
placed on state ownership: a tradition of public mistrust of government
power" coupled with the "sanctity of private property" 163 worked
against whole-scale substitution of state for king. In fact, the doctrine lay
dormant for many years, and was never used as aggressively as was the
police powers or powers of eminent domain. 114 Recently, however, the
public trust doctrine has been greatly expanded, and it is in this ex-
panded role that it approximates a true public right in common
resources.
A. The Public Trust Doctrine as a Form of Public Ownership
For purposes of evaluating the public trust doctrine in such a con-
text, the question to be answered is whether the resources held in trust
are completely beyond the police powers of the state, thereby "making
them inalienable and unchangeable in use;' 6s or whether the trust is
"nothing more than.., the general police power... [imposing] no re-
straint on government action beyond that which is implicit in all judicial
review of state action.... 16 6
While that question has never been fully answered,1 67 court review
of state actions support the latter choice - i.e., that the state is not seri-
ously limited in how it treats public resources. This is so despite the
recent, almost activist interpretation the courts have used to expand the
uses covered under the doctrine:
Over time, [the public trust doctrine] has been expanded to include hunting,
swimming, bathing, and mineral and energy development.... Since 1973,
[it has also] been held to apply to general recreational purposes, the alloca-
tion of water rights under western approgriative water law principles, and
the issuance of hazardous waste permits.
Proponents of the public trust doctrine hold it out as the only con-
cept in American law with enough "breadth and substantive content...
[to] make it useful as a tool of general application for citizens seeking to
161. Kosloff, supra note 158, at 10,201.
162. SELVIN, supra note 11, at 40-41.
163. Id.
164. See generally SELVIN, supra note 11.
165. Sax, supra note 8, at 477.
166. Id.
167. Sax, supra note 8, at 480.
168. Kosloff, supra note 158, at 10,201.
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develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management
problems." 169 While the doctrine might have that capability, it has never
been exercised to its utmost extent. Even as courts were apparently dra-
matically expanding coverage of resources and uses under the doctrine,
they were also hamstringing it by legitimizing breaches of that trust.
Courts have often upheld state transfers of public trust resources to
private parties, 170 despite the fact that the state as trustee is not supposed
to alienate the resources subject to the trust. One of the largest transfers
involved the sale of land under the navigable waters (the "classic" public
trust res6urce) extending a mile out into Lake Michigan, encompassing
almost the whole of the Chicago waterfront. 171 More recently, debates
over the sale of public wilderness and forest land 172 have also thrown into
question how absolute a right the public trust doctrine really grants to
the public.
Even with the pressure to expand the scope of the public trust doc-
trine, it has generally been limited in application to those traditional sit-
uations involving navigation and fishing. 173  Furthermore, the public
trust doctrine has proved difficult to expand to cover new uses and new
resources,1 74 and for that reason it has not had a great impact in terms of
protecting the environment.17 5 It is also for that reason that the public
trust doctrine fails as a mechanism for promoting public rights in shared
common resources.
A public right in common resources is a more basic concept than the
public trust doctrine. The right cannot vest in a state or sovereign that
purports to act as a trustee for the public; instead, it vests in every indi-
vidual who constitutes that public. To some extent, such a right revives
the notion of the commons.
B. The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited
Resources such as air, and water that flows on non-navigable water-
169. Sax, supra note 8, at 474.
170. Id. at 488.
171. Illinois Cent. R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
172. See, eg., C. BRANT SHORT, RONALD REAGAN AND THE PUBLIC LANDS: AMERICA'S
CONSERVATION DEBATE, 1979-1984 (1989); CHARLES F. WILKINSON AND H. MICHAEL ANDER-
SON, LAND AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS (1987); Egan, supra note 78, at
Al.
173. SKILLER, supra note 67, at 12.
174. "Although its potential for development and expanded use remains great, because it is a
judicial doctrine, its use requires case-by-case evaluation and application. Thus, its expansion and
broader use without statutory modification have been very slow processes." Id. at 12.
175. Id.
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ways, are often considered unowned resources (res nullius) instead of
common property (res communes). 7 6 Because such resources are "ubiq-
uitous, ' 177 they have traditionally been excluded from the resources con-
stituting "common property." 178  Under a public right in common
resources, however, resource users and non-users alike would have actual
vested rights in those "unowned" resources. Vesting such rights would
help to overcome the presumption of resource deterioration found in the
tragedy of the commons.
1 79
Under this new conception, a user of a common resource would
have a vested interest in the common resource, as would the non-user
and the potential user. Faced with the vested interests of the other par-
ties (or "public rights" ' ) in that common resource, the user would pay
not only for any damage done to the resource, but also for actual re-
source use. To some extent, this has been the rationale behind some of
the clean air and water regulation, which fine polluters for their effluent.
Under this expanded concept of public rights, however, resource users
would compensate the other stakeholders for using that common
resource.
As a result, the right of the other stakeholders in the common re-
source would receive a new priority - the priority it had been denied
under the "reasonable use" balancing test."' This new regime "would
recognize diffusely-held claims as public rights, entitled to equal consid-
eration in legislative or judicial resolution of confficting claims to the
common resource base, without regard to the manner in which they are
held." ' The new regime would, in effect, create a much broader
"commons."
1. The Reasonable Commons. One of the chief criticisms of com-
munal property ownership is that absent a vested interest in the common
resource, each party will attempt to extract the maximum that an "eco-
nomically rational" user would extract.18 3 Communal ownership fails to
adequately assign the costs of resource use to the resource user, encour-
aging parties to "overhunt and overwork the land because some of the
176. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, supra note 10, at 715.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 724.
179. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
180. See Sax, supra note 64, at 155.
181. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
182. Sax, supra note 64, at 159.
183. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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costs of his doing so are borne by the others. The stock of the game and
the richness of the soil will be diminished too quickly." '
Under the new system of rights in public resources, however, the
community would assign that cost to the resource user. That assignment
might take the form of a refundable fee or bond, for example, that would
be used to compensate the other property rightholders in the event the
user consumes more than a "fair" share of the resource. The presump-
tion under the old system had been that because the property is commu-
nal, the user owes nothing to the other users. Under the new system, it is
precisely because the property is communal that the user owes something
to the other stakeholders. Assessing a user fee is only one way of recog-
nizing that responsibility at the outset.
Critics of the commons also assume that the resource user in a com-
munal property system is "unreasonable:" i.e., when given the chance,
that user will overuse the communal property. 18 5 Such an assumption
may have been in line with earlier views towards resource use,'8 6 but the
development of an environmental ethic"8 7 raises the possibility that re-
source users are no longer so voracious, and instead see resource use in
an ecosystems context. In effect, it creates and encourages the possibility
of a reasonable, not economically rational, community property holder.
2. The Global Commons. Conservation movements speak strongly
to the possibility of a reasonable resource user, especially when the "com-
mons" is defined as the global biosphere. Under such a conception, it
becomes "reasonable" to relate individual energy consumption to issues
of resource depletion, environmental degradation, and even, as the Gulf
War pointed out, geopolitics. The decision not to consume as much en-
ergy as possible becomes the rational decision.
Ultimately, it is by envisioning resource use in the context of a
global commons that the tragedy of the commons is averted. Especially
when the common property in question is air and water, it does not make
sense to look at an individual's use of those resources in isolation. The
resources are tapped from common sources, such as groundwater or
lakes or streams, and are returned to those sources after the individual
has made use of them.
Surely it is naive ... to suppose that one who profits from a piece of prop-
184. Demsetz, supra note 92, at 354.
185. Id.
186. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
187. SKILLER, supra note 67.
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erty necessarily uses only those resources within his boundaries, and
equally naive to think the consequences of one property user's activities are
confined to his property .... [Property is] inextricably part of a network of
relationships that is neither limited to, nor usefully defined by, the property
boundaries with which the legal system is accustomed to dealing. 88
Given that such basic relationships are involved in resource use, it
would make sense to create a basic right that respected the relationship
between resources and resource users. Such a right could take the form
of a constitutional amendment.
IV. AN ENVIRONMENTAL AMENDMENT: GUARANTEEING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS To A CLEAN AND SAFE
ENVIRONMENT THROUGH STRONGER PUBLIC
RIGHTS IN COMMON RESOURCES
As the previous sections have discussed, property rights in common
resources have largely been assigned on the basis of economic utility,
and, as would be expected given the incomplete formulas used to calcu-
late that utility, conflicts over competing uses have been largely resolved
in favor of the heaviest-capitalized and most aggressive resource users.
The explosion in environmental degradation during the second half of
this century has done little to alter this bias, in part because individuals
lacked the power to challenge it. A constitutional amendment recogniz-
ing the right of every individual to a safe and clean environment would
help address that legal imbalance.
A constitutional amendment that granted a right to a clean and safe
environment would do several things for the average citizen. Most im-
portantly, it would recognize that a right to a clean environment is as
fundamental a right as is the right to enjoy equal protection before the
law. It would grant automatic standing for every citizen to challenge
environmental degradation, and it would force policy makers to adopt a
long range approach to economic development that is more ecologically
sound. It would decidedly shift the burden of proof on questions of envi-
ronmental damage onto the parties who are responsible for the resource
use and who may best be able to bear the cost. And lastly, it would force
resource users to more equitably value the resources they use, while cre-
ating a mechanism for halting degradation of those resources.
A constitutional amendment would embody a sort of "super nonex-
clusive benefit" by recognizing that all individuals have a stake in how
188. Sax, supra note 64, at 152.
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this country's resources are used, not just those to whom the immediate
benefits of resource use accrue. A rough parallel can be drawn between
this and the 13th Amendment: while slavery was defended as an eco-
nomic necessity by slave states, and had little immediate impact on non-
slave states, the existence of slavery itself corrupted the morals of all of
this country's citizens, not just those party to it. For the sake of the
moral and political health of the entire country, slavery had to be
abolished.
Similarly, the current practice of allowing private resource users to
profit from environmentally harmful activities threatens, if not the moral,
then at least the physical health of the country. A constitutional amend-
ment guaranteeing a right to a clean environment would at least recog-
nize that every citizen has a stake in how this country's resources are
treated and developed.
The amendment could be constructed as simply as any of the others
that grant basic rights: All citizens shall have the right to a clean and safe
environment. What constitutes a "clean and safe" environment would be
defined by courts as the amendment was enforced and challenged; its
most important function, however, would be in granting a foundation for
individuals to stand on in their efforts to preserve their access to shared,
common resources. Until such an amendment is drafted, however, the
average citizen remains disenfranchised because of the institutional bias
in favor of the larger-scale resource user.
A. The Dangers of Institutional Disenfranchisement
Congress has attempted to level the playing field between large and
small-scale common resource users through environmental legislation,
but critics now fear that Congress is abandoning even the pretense of
doing that much.18 9 They claim that pressure from special interest
groups - those same heavily-capitalized, aggressive resource users -
have encouraged members of Congress to attack the ability of citizens
and environmental groups to challenge decisions by federal agencies that
were created to protect the environment.1 90
189. See eg., Victor M. Sher, Ancient Forests, Spotted Owls and the Demise of Federal Environ-
mental Law, 20 ENVTL. L. RP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,469 (1990). Sher contends that Congress has
been drafting legislation designed to limit the rights of citizens to seek redress against action by land
management agencies in federal court.
190. In particular, Congress has inserted "riders" into other legislation that seek "to limit or
eliminate federal judicial review of logging practices that are rapidly destroying ancient forests";
judicial review is one of the most important measures for insuring that the spirit and letter of envi-
ronmental protection legislation is carried out. Id.
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Courts have restricted the ability of small-scale or alternative re-
source users to challenge the federal agency actions and regulations that
determine how the environmental protection legislation is imple-
mented. 19 1 Despite an initial liberal orientation by the judiciary, recent
decisions in several cases' 92 show the courts making it more difficult for
opponents of large-scale resource use to achieve standing to bring their
actions to court. 193 The Supreme Court has also made it more difficult
for plaintiffs to sue to protect interests in environmental quality1 94 by
imposing additional requirements that plaintiffs show a traceable causal
connection between the alleged injury and the challenged conduct, and
that a plaintiff show a substantial likelihood that the relief sought will
remedy the asserted injury.' 9 Even where federal statutes authorize citi-
zen suitS19 6 to review agency implementation, standing is not automati-
cally granted.
1 97
In short, individuals and advocates of common resource protection
have become disenfranchised. When a population has suffered wide scale
disenfranchisement in the past, constitutional amendments have been
used to restore that populace to a legal whole. Amendments have guar-
anteed equal protection before the law;198 equal voting rights;199 and a
right to be free from slavery.2" A constitutional amendment guarantee-
ing enfranchisement to protect even more basic rights - the right to
191. Barnett M. Lawrence, Standing for Environmental Groups: An Overview and Recent Devel-
opments in the D.C. Circuit, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,289 (1989).
192. See, ,ag., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (standing denied unless actual injury
is shown); Wilderness Soe'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d. 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (plaintiffs failed to show sufficient
likelihood of future injury to survive a motion for summary judgment); National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Burford 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988) (plaintiff lacked standing to sue on its own behalf or on
behalf of its members' environmental interests); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Burford,
716 F. Supp. 632 (D.D.C. 1988); Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
793 F.2d. 1322, 1328-29 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (damage to plaintiff's commitment to effective energy
conservation not enough to show damage to its activities), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 806 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir. 1986), opinion and judgment vacated by, 810 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
193. Lawrence, supra note 191.
194. SKILLER, supra note 67, at 5 (Supp. 1991).
195. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72-74 (1978).
196. See, eg., Clean Air Act § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988).
197. SKILLER, supra note 67, at 4 (Supp. 1990).
198. "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
199. "The right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S.
CONST. amend. XV. "The rights of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX
200. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the
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breathe clean air, to drink clean water, and to live on non-polluted lands
- would therefore not be without precedent.
B. Setting a Minimum Standard of Environmental Protection
A constitutional amendment would correct several of the problems
encountered by the administrative approach to environmental protection
detailed above by creating a floor below which no individual's rights in
common resources would sink. As with the amendments listed above, an
individual would have recourse to a "protection of last resort" when
other legal protection proved inadequate.
1. The Bureaucratic Quagmire. Granting a constitutional right to
clean resources would go a long way to insuring that conflicts over re-
source use are decided by reference to basic rights, thereby removing
those conflicts from the quagmire of administrative law.
When faced with complex environmental issues, the huge bureaucracy of
the [EPA] is more capable of responding to political pressures than of antic-
ipating problems, setting priorities, or developing practical solutions....
Congress is too cumbersome an institution to respond to complex, and
sometimes poorly understood, threats of environmental harm with timely
and effective legislation. Even when the EPA and Congress have acted,
powerful economic interests such as the oil and mining industries have
demonstrated their ability to convince both institutions to grant broad ex-
emptions from environmental laws, taking vast amounts of dangerous sub-
stances out of the regulatory system.
20 1
One of the main criticisms of current environmental protection ef-
forts is that they are too disjointed, involving too many agencies and
congressional players.20 2 Creating a constitutional amendment would
help center environmental protection efforts around a common theme:
protection of individual rights in clean resources. Doing so could lead to
a more comprehensive, uniform approach to resource management,
which would help to create "a unified codification of environmental pro-
tection laws ... [that] would provide the basis for a more efficient and
cost-effective regulatory system for both government and the regulated
community."
20 3
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII.
201. Babich, supra note 60, at 10,058.
202. Currently eleven House and nine Senate committees oversee the actions of the EPA. See
Adams & Cox, supra note 103, at 10,367.
203. Id. at 10,370.
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2. Preemptive Protection of Common Resources. One of the most
pernicious problems facing proponents of clean resources is that much of
the legislation and action takes place after the environmental degradation
takes place. A constitutional amendment could force resource users to
address questions of resource use and degradation prior to beginning ac-
tivities that could harm the environment.
Because environmental legislation ignored the origin of the assault on envi-
ronmental quality, it has dealt only with its subsequent effects. And, having
defined the disease as a collection of symptoms, the legislation mandates
only palliative measures. The notion of preventing pollution - the only
measure that really works - appears but fitfuly in the environmental laws
and has never been given any administrative force.
2°4
Requiring each party to address the consequences of its proposed
resource use prior to beginning any activity" 5 would achieve several
goals. It would help to estimate the potential impact of the intended
resource use, not only on resource degradation but on resource depletion
as well. It would also serve notice to the members of the affected public
that a resource it holds a stake in was going to be consumed, thereby
bringing the public into the "market" to help determine fair market com-
pensation for use of that shared resource.
For example, a commercial enterprise might be required to publish
an environmental impact statement in all of the communities that would
be affected by any proposed use of local resources. That enterprise might
also be required to float a bond to cover any potential environmental
degradation or accident. Finally, it would have to pay some percentage
of its profits to the public in recognition of the fact that those resources
belong to it, and to cover the loss of resource reserves.
If the price of resource use (including the compensatory charge) be-
comes very high, that higher price merely reflects a more efficient market
at work. As more parties are exposed at the outset to the potential risks
and costs of resource use and degradation, it is only right that the party
expecting to make a profit from the use pay more for the privilege.
3. Burdens of Proof. In line with that goal, a constitutional
amendment would also help to shift the burden of justifying any pro-
posed resource use to the party that wants to make a profit out of it. As a
204. Commoner, supra note 69, at 10,196.
205. NEPA requires an environmental impact statement "to enable the public to become more
cognizant of harm from activities undertaken by the federal government and of the controversy
concerning them." SKILLER, supra note 67, at 24; 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988). A constitutional amend-
ment would require the same of private parties.
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result, the resource-using, potentially-polluting party would have to an-
swer a very basic question: should the rest of the community tolerate its
consumption and pollution of community resources? Asking that ques-
tion would emphasize the fact that the right to be free from pollution
preempts the right to engage in a polluting activity - no matter how
profitable that activity is to the private party.
The case for shifting the burden of proof seems especially strong
where toxic chemicals are concerned. Because the effects of exposure to
certain chemicals frequently do not appear for many years after expo-
sure, and are often very difficult to attribute to a specific chemical or the
enterprise that used it, many individuals are effectively barred from pur-
suing common law remedies against the polluting concern. By shifting
the burden of proof onto the polluting concern, however, an individual
would stand a better chance of recovering something for any injuries suf-
fered as a result of that exposure.
Once a person who has been exposed to dangerous pollutants makes a
showing of an increased risk of harm, it should be the polluter's burden to
show that the jury should not award damages. The polluter is in the best
position to monitor and analyze its toxic wastes and to rebut potential vic-
tims' claims of increased risk [of cancer, birth defects or other injuries] and
to reduce exposures in the first place. By making polluters liable for injuries
to public health, and adjusting the requirements of proof appropriately,
Congress can motivate polluters to study and control the risks posed by
their activities.20 6
A constitutional amendment guaranteeing the right to a clean and
safe environment would change the current sequence of common re-
source use from activity, pollution and retribution to consultation, ap-
proval, compensation, and, only then, activity.
C. International Efforts in Environmental Rights
The United States would not be the first entity to propose an amend-
ment that recognized a right to a safe and clean environment. The
United Nations will be considering just such a idea when it convenes to
discuss the environment in 1992 in Brazil,2 "7 but even that will not be the
first time the United Nations has considered doing so.
The United Nations originally considered the idea that individuals
206. Babich, supra note 60, at 10,059.
207. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) is sched-
uled for June, 1992 in Brazil. That month marks the twentieth anniversary of the UN's first confer-
ence on the environment-the Stockholm Conference in 1972.
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have a right to a clean and safe environment in 1972 at its Conference on
the Human Environment.2 °0 The "Stockholm Conference" was held to
consider "the need for a common outlook and for common principles to
inspire and guide the peoples of the world in the preservation and en-
hancement of the human environment."2 9 Considered by some to be the
start of the global environmental movement,210 the Stockholm Confer-
ence attempted to lay down some general principles regarding human-
kind's relationship with, and responsibility to, the world environment. 211
The United Nations has followed up this effort with an exhaustive
study that concluded in 1987 with the publication of Our Common Fu-
ture: The World Commission on Environment and Development.212 Our
Common Future examined the state of the world's environment, as well
as prospects for economic growth consistent with environmental con-
cerns. This study included the concept of an individual right to a clean
and safe environment, and how ultimately, resource-use decisions must
come back to the individual as the entity most intimately affected by
those decisions.
At its conference in 1992, the United Nations will consider the
208. This 1972 conference marked the first time that UN members gathered to specifically dis-
cuss the state of the world's environment. It produced the Report of the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1972).
209. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Confer-
ence on the Human Environment, at pmbl. (1972).
210. STARKE, supra note 88, at 185.
211. Principle 1, for example, declares that:
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in
an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a
solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future
generations. In this respect, policies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial segre-
gation, discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign domination
stand condemned and must be eliminated.
Principle 5 states that resources must be "employed in such a way as to guard against the danger of
their future exhaustion and to ensure that benefits from such employment are shared by all man-
kind." Principle 13 states:
In order to achieve a more rational management of resources and thus to improve the
environment, States should adopt an integrated and co-ordinated approach to their de-
velopment planning so as to ensure that development is compatible with the need to
protect and improve environment [sic] for the benefit of their population.
And finally, Principle 14 states that "[r]ational planning constitutes an essential tool for reconciling
any conflict between the needs of development and the need to protect and improve the environ-
ment." EXPERTS GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRON-
MENT AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
149-52 (Martinus Nijoff et al., eds., 1987) (citing Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human
Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1972)).
212. See supra note 79.
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claim that the right to a safe and clean environment should be added to
the pantheon of basic human rights. Advocates of such a determina-
tion213 point out that many international proposals already include "the
rights of individuals and non-governmental entities to a pure and decent
environment within the ambit of present day human rights conven-
tions, '2 14 indicating that legislators in the international realm would not
consider the codification of a basic human right a radical and unwork-
able quggestion.
D. Conclusion
A constitutional amendment would obviously require a great deal of
debate, and could be tied up in Congress for years. It is not the easiest
solution, nor is it necessarily the best solution to current problems of
environmental degradation. However, it would go a long way towards
correcting the current imbalance in rights between large-scale users of
common resources, and those who advocate limited or non-use of them.
In essence, the amendment would recognize that every individual has a
stake in how common resources are used, and that in the final analysis, a
right to a clean and safe environment, like the rights to freedom and to
the pursuit of happiness, is inalienable.
213. See, eg., W. Paul Gormley, The Right to a Safe and Decent Environment, 28 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 1 (1988).
214. Id. at 31.
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